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Introduction
The years between 1955 and 1970 have witnessed an increasingly
rapid and broad incursion of computers into industrial organizations.
During this time, computer-related activities collectively termed
"management information systems" have also grown markedly. But
despite the growth in these two areas, very few of the resulting
systems have had significant impact on management. Generally these
systems have done little to effect the way in which management makes
decisions . We contend that a major reason for this failure to improve
the decision-making ability of management is a lack of
an appropriate framework within which to view the range of potential
systems applications.
In many groups doing MIS work, this lack of perspective prevents
the full appreciation of the variety of organizational uses for com- I
puters. Without a framework to guide management and systems planners,
the tendency is to serve the strongest manager or the greatest crisis.
As a result, systems activities too often may move from crisis to
crisis following no clear path, receiving only ex £OSt facto justifica-
tion. This tendency inflicts an unnecessary expense on the organization.
Not only are costly computer resources wasted, but even more costly
human resources are mismanaged. The cost of systems and programming
personnel is generally twice that of the hardware involved in a
typical project, and the ratio is growing larger as the cost of hard-
ware drops and salaries rise. Competent people are expensive. More
importantly, they exist only in limited numbers. This limitation

actively constrains the amount of systems development work that can
be undertaken in a given organization, and so good resource allocation
is critical.
The need to reassess the framework within which we view the
allocation of resources to systems activities is underscored by
developments in two distinct areas within the last five years that
offer us the potential to develop altogether new ways of supporting
decision processes. First there has been considerable technological
progress. The evolution of remote access to computers with short
turnaround time and flexible user interfaces has been rapid.
Users can be linked to computer resources through low cost typewriter
and graphical display devices. These developments offer new possi-
bilities for management information and decision systems. The second
development in the past few years has been a conceptual one. There
is emerging an understanding of the potential role information systems
within organizations. We are adding to our knowledge of how human
beings solve problems and of how to build models that capture aspects
of the human decision-making processes.
The progress in these areas has been dramatic. Entirely new
kinds of planning and control systems can now be built -- ones that
dynamically involve the manager's judgment and support him with
analysis, models, and flexible access to relevant information. But
to fully realize this potential, there must be an appropriate frame-
work within which to view management decision making and the required
systems support. The purpose of this paper is to present such a

framework -- one which we believe helps us to understand the evolution
of MIS activities within organizations and to recognize some of the
potential problems and benefits resulting from our new understanding
and our new technology. Thus this framework is designed to be useful
in planning for information systems activities within an organization
and for distinguishing between the different kinds of model building,
people, models, computer systems and so forth that are used for sup-
porting decisions in the various categories. It is, by definition,
a static picture, a snapshot, and is not designed to say anything
about how information systems are built in each of the areas. For
this purpose we would need a process model of information system
implementation.
Our plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows. In the
next section we want to consider some of the general advantages of
developing a framework for information systems work. Then we want to
propose a specific framework which we have found to be useful in the
analysis of MIS activities. We believe that this framework offers us
a new way to characterize the progress that has been made to date,
and it offers us insight into the problems that have been encountered.
In the third section of the paper we want to use this framework to
help us analyze the types of resources that are required in the dif-
ferent decision areas and the ways in which those resources should be
used. Our feeling is that there exists a tremendous potential to use
new ideas and new technology to augment the decision-making ability
of management, but unless the issues that we raise are met squarely.

U is yery unlikely that this potential will be realized.
Framework Development
In this section we want to propose a framework for viewing mana-
gerial activities within organizations, but before doing that, we want
to try to indicate some of the values which one can expect from the
development of a framework in general. Basically, the framework of
the type we are interested in is a structuring of ideas. The potential
value of the framework arises from the organization it imposes upon
our ideas in a given area.
The framework we will develop here is one for managerial activities,
not for information systems. It is a way of looking at decisions made
in an organization. Information systems should exist only to support
decisions, and hence we are looking for a characterization of managerial
activity in these terms. For reasons which we will make clear in the
remainder of this paper, we believe that an understanding of managerial
activity is a prerequisite for effective systems design and implemen-
tation. Most MIS groups are deeply involved in system development and
implementation without a prior analysis of the variety of managerial
activities. This has prevented them from developing a sufficiently
broad definition of their purpose and has resulted in a generally
inefficient allocation of resources.
In attempting to understand the evolution and problems of
management information systems, we have found the work of two authors

particularly useful. The first is Robert Anthony, who, in his book
Planning and Control Systems : A Framework for Analysis , addresses
the problem of developing a classification scheme that will allow
management some perspective when dealing with planning and control
systems. He develops a taxonomy for managerial activity consisting
of three categories and argues that these categories represent
activities sufficiently different in kind to require the development
of different systems.
The first of Anthony's categories of managerial activity is
strategic planning : "Strategic planning is the process of deciding
on objectives of the organization, on changes in these objectives,
on the resources used to attain these objectives, and on the policies
that are to govern the acquisition, use and disposition of these
2
resources." Certain things can be said about strategic planning
generally. First, it focuses on the choice of objectives for the
organization and on the activities and means required to achieve these
objectives. As a result, a major problem in this area 1s the devel-
opment of predictions about the future of the organization and its
environment. Second, the strategic planning process typically involves
a fairly small number of high level people who operate in a nonrepeti-
tive and often very creative way. The complexity of the problems that
arise and the nonroutine manner in which they are dealt with makes it
quite difficult to appraise the quality of this planning process.
Robert Anthony, Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for
Analysis , Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University
Boston, 1965.
^
Op. cit , p. 25.

The second category defined by Anthony is that of management
control : "Management control is the process by which managers
assure that resources are being used effectively and efficiently in
the accomplishment of the organization's objectives." He stresses
three key aspects of this area. First, the activity involves inter-
personal interaction. Second, it takes place within the context of
the policies and objectives developed in the strategic planning process.
Third, the paramount goal of management control is the assurance of
effective and efficient performance.
Anthony's third category is operational control , by which he
means "the process of assuring specific tasks are carried out effec-
2
tively and efficiently." The basic distinction between management
control and operational control is that between the activity properly
referred to as management and activities that relate the the performance
of specified tasks. Specifically we can say that operational control
is concerned with tasks (such as manufacturing a specific part) whereas
management control is most often concerned with people. Also, there
is much less judgment to be exercised in the operational control area
because the tasks, goals and resources have been carefully delineated
through the management control activity.
We recognize, as does Anthony, that the boundaries between these
three categories are often not clear. In spite of the limitations and
uncertainties of these categories, however, we have found them quite
useful in the analysis of information system activities. For example.
^
Qp. cit ., p. 27.
^
Op. cit ., p. 69.

if we consider the information requirements of these three activities,
we can see that they are yery different from one another. Further,
this difference is not simply a matter of aggregation, but one of funda-
mental character of the information needed by managers in these areas.
Strategic planning is concerned with setting broad policies and
goals for the organization. As a result, the relationship of the
organization to its environment is a central matter of concern. Also,
the nature of the activity is such that predictions about the future
are particularly important. In general, then, we can say that the
information needed by strategic planners has certain properties.
First, it is generally aggregate information. Also, a large portion of
the relevant information is obtained from sources external to the
organization itself. Both the scope of the information and the variety
of the types of information are quite large. At the same time, the
requirements for accuracy of the information are not particularly strin-
gent. Finally, the nonroutine nature of the strategic planning process
means that the demands for this information occur infrequently.
The information needs for the operational control area, however,
stand in sharp contrast to those of strategic planning. This contrast
is a direct reflection of the basic differences between these two
activities. The task orientation of operational control requires infor-
mation of a well-defined and narrow scope. This information is quite
detailed and arises largely from internal sources within the organization,
Very frequent use is made of this information, and it is important that

the information be accurate.
In general along each of these dimensions, the information
requirements for management control fall between the extremes for
operational control and strategic planning. In addition it is impor-
tant to recognize that an important part of the information which is
relevant to management control is obtained through the process of
interpersonal interaction.
In Figure 1 we have summarized these general observations about
the categories of management activity. This summary is subject to the
same limitations and uncertainties which are exhibited by the concepts
of management control, strategic planning and operational control.
Nonetheless, it does underscore our contention that because the activi-
ties themselves are different, the information requirements to support
these activities are also different.
This summary of information needs suggests the reason why many
organizations have found it increasingly difficult to realize some of
their long range plans for information systems. Many of these plans
are based on the "total systems approach." Some of the proponents
of this approach advocate (1) that systems throughout the organization
be tightly linked, with the output of one becoming the direct input of
another, and (2) that the whole structure be built on the detailed
data used for controlling operations. In doing so, they are suggesting
an approach to systems design that is at best uneconomic and at worst
is based on a potentially fatal misconception.

Ol
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The first major problem with this view is that it does not
recognize the ongoing nature of systems development in the operational
control area. There is little reason to believe that this systems
work in any major organization will be complete within the forseeable
future. To say that management information systems activity must wait
"until we get our operational control systems in hand" is to say that
efforts to assist management with systems support will be deferred
indefinitely.
The second and perhaps most serious problem with this total
systems view is that it fails to properly represent the information
needs of the management control and strategic planning activities.
Neither of these areas necessarily needs information that is a mere
aggregation of data from the operational control data base. In many
cases if such a link is needed, it is more cost effective to use
sampling from this data base and other statistical techniques to develop
the required information. Seldom if ever does it make sense to
directly couple managers in the management control and strategic planning
areas to the masses of detailed data required for operational control.
Not only is this direct coupling unnecessary, but it is often an expensive
and difficult technical problem.
For these reasons it is easy to understand why so many companies
have had the following experience. Original plans for operational
control systems were met with more or less difficulty, but as time
passed it became increasingly apparent that the planned systems for

nhigher management were not being developed on schedule (1f at all).
To make matters worse, the systems which were developed for senior
management had relatively little impact on the way in which these
managers made decisions. This last problem is a direct result of
the failure to understand the basic information needs of different
activities.
We have tried to show in the above discussion how Anthony's
classification of managerial activities is a useful consideration for
people working in information systems design and implementation. His
ideas are an important component of the framework which we will present.
When we have that framework in hand, we will then return to consider in
more detail some of the implications of these ideas. At the moment,
however, we would like to introduce a second way of looking at manage-
ment activities into our discussion. Anthony's classification of
managerial activity, from the viewpoint of planning and control, can
be complemented by Herbert Simon's general discussion of human problem
solving.
Simon's work is concerned with the manner in which human beings
solve problems irrespective of their position within an organization.
His distinction between "programmed" and "nonprogrammed" decisions
is a useful one for us. He regards them as being at the opposite ends
of a continuum, and he is careful to assert that they are not sharply
defined categories. Simon describes these two types of decisions as
follows:
^H. A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decision , Harper and
Rowe, 1960, p. 6.
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1. Decisions are programmed to the extent that they are
repetitive and routine, to the extent that a definite
procedure has been worked out for handling them so
that they don't have to be treated de novo each time
they occur.
2. Decisions are nonprogrammed to the extent that they
are novel, unstructured and consequential. There is
no cut-and-dried method of handling the problem because
it hasn't arisen before, because its precise nature
and structure are elusive or complex, or because it
is so important that it deserves a custom-tailored
treatment. By nonprogrammed I mean a response where
the system has no specific procedure to deal with
situations like the one at hand but must fall back on
whatever general capacity it has for intelligent,
adaptive, problem-oriented action.
We will use the terms "structured" and "unstructured" for programned
and nonprogrammed because they imply less dependence on the computer
and more dependence on the basic character of the problem-solving
activity in question.
Distinguishing between these two types of problems is important
because we approach solving the two types differently. Different
procedures, different kinds of computation, and different types of
information may be required depending on the extent to which the
problem in question is unstructured. The basis for these differences
lies in the fact that the human decision maker must provide judgment
and evaluation as well as insights into problem definition in the
unstructured case. Such a situation differs fundamentally from that
associated with problem solving for very structured problems. Here
much if not all of the decision-making process can be automated.
Later in this paper we will argue that systems built to support
structured decision making will be significantly different from those
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designed to support managers in dealing with unstructured problems.
Further, we will try to show that this difference can be traced to
the different character of the models which are relevant to each of
these types of problems and the way in which these models are developed,
This focus on decisions requires an understanding of the human
decision-making process. Research on the oroblem of human problem
solving supports Simon's claim that all problem solving can be broken
down into three categories:
1. The first phase of the decision-making process,
searching the environment for conditions calling
for a decision, I shall call intelligence activity
(borrowing the military meaning of intelligence).
The second phase — inventing, develooinq, and
analyzing possible courses of action — I shall
call design activity. The third phase — selecting
course of action from those available — I shall
call choice activity.
2. Generally speaking, intelligence activity precedes
design, and design activity precedes choice. The
cycle of phases is, however, far more complex than
the sequence suggests. Each phase in making a
particular decision is itself a complex decision-
making process. The design phase, for example,
may call for new intelligence activities; problems
at any given level generate subproblems that in turn have
their own intelligence, design and choice phases,
and so on. There are wheels within wheels. Never-
theless, the three large phases are often clearly
discernible as the organizational decision process
unfolds. They are closely related to the stages
in problem solving first described by John Dewey:
What is the problem? What are the alternatives?
Which alternative is best?2
In this, Simon clearly makes the point that this problem-solving
process is a highly iterative hierarchical process. For example, the
Simon, op. cit., p. 4.
^John Dewey, How We Think, Chapter 8, D. C. Heath & Company,
Jew York, 1910,
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intelligence phase could be thought of as a subproblem which in order
to "find" a problem requires the user to go through the intelligence,
design and choice phases at another level from that of the initial
problem statement. This interactive, hierarchical character is hard
to represent on paper, but it should be kept clearly in mind during
the following discussion.
A fully structured problem is one in which all three phases,
intelligence, design and choice, are structured. That is, we can
specify algorithms, or decision rules, that will allow us to find
the problem, design solutions, and select the best solution. An
example here might be the inventory control problem in a simple
case --one where demand was known with a ligh degree of accuracy and
replenishment times were ^ery predictable with all costs known
reasonably accurately. In such a case, we can set up criteria to tell
us when there is a problem (the re-order point is broken). Given this
condition, the solution generation process uses a known model (the
re-order quantity formula) and the latest numbers and generates an
answer which in this case is chosen automatically.
Similarly, in a semi-structured area we can find problems where
the search for a problem is difficult, although the design and the
choice of a solution is relatively easy. In such a case we might
want to design a flexible man-machine interaction in the search
activity and leave the design and choice to the computer. When all
phases are unstructured, we can only provide access to data and
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useful ways of displaying it.
In the ideas of Simon and Anthony, then, we have two different
ways of looking at managerial activity within organizations. Anthony's
categorization is really based on the purpose of the management
activity, whereas Simon's classification is based on the way in which
the manager deals with the problems which confront him. The combin-
ation of these two different views provides what we feel is a useful
framework within which to view the purposes and problems of information
systems activity. This combination is given in Figure 2 where we have
further separated the class of decision we are calling semi -structured.
These decisions are those with one or two of the intelligence, design
and choice phases unstructured. It is this semi -structured area where
the interactive terminal systems have their greatest potential. We
have listed some examples in each of the cells but it should be
stressed once again that these are not well-defined precise categories
but rather general boundaries. Decisions that fall above the dividing
line are largely structured and information systems that support these
we have termed structured decision systems (SDS). Decisions below the
line are largely unstructured and we have chosen to term information
systems that support these Management Decision Systems (MDS). The SDS
area encompasses almost all of what JTas_ been called Management Information
Systems (MIS) in the literature -- an area that has had almost nothing
to do with real managers or information but has been largely routine
data processing. We exclude from consideration here all of the information
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handling activities in an organization. A large percentage of computer
time in many organizations is spent on pure information handling with
no decisions, however structured, involved. The payroll application,
simple status report processing, etc are examples.
Some illustruations of our framework categories may make their
meaning clearer:
Structured Operational Control
Decisions on Order Entry. The decisions involved when a
customer's order is received. Which discounts to apply,
what price is applicable, which warehouse to fill the order
from, the means by which it should be shipped and so forth.
Each of these decisions is governed by well-defined rules
and is an integral part of the ongoing operations.
Decisions on Inventory Control. A further example occurs
on the inventory reordering decisions for the high volume parts
a company stocks. When, and how much, to order are well
understood structured decisions.
Unstructured Operational Control
PERT/COST Analysis. The use of a PERT/COST system in an
ongoing project control situation involves judgmental inputs
from the decision maker. Which tasks have become the most
important problems, what might possible solutions be, what
will the impact of any given solution be, which solution is
the best? Many of these questions are unstructured and such
a control system is part of an ongoing operational decision.

Job-Shop Scheduling. Decisions as to which jobs to schedule on
which particular machines for what time period is an operational
control decision for which there exists no good automatic decision
process. Good models do not exist for its solution; judgment
plays an important part.
Structured Management Control
Budget Analysis. The variance analysis of "engineered" costs
is a management control activity that is largely structured.
The cause and effect relationships are directly determinable
from the data.
Forecasting Short Term. Production and sales decisions based
on short term forecasts are well understood decisions. The
forecasts themselves can be done tolerably well and their
relationship to sales or production decisions is almost auto-
matic.
Unstructured Management Control
Budget Preparation. The setting of budget levels and the
variables to be included are both decisions which often require
significant managerial inputs. How much to expand or increase
any given line item, new expenses to be considered and so forth.
Sales and Production Planning, Decisions for the future for
sales or production levels and the co-ordination between them
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are all unstructured areas where decisions on a three to twenty-
four month horizon are often critical.
Structured Strategic Planning
Tanker Fleet Mix. Decisions on the strategy to employ with
regard to the composition of the distribution system for an
oil company are determined in large measure by economics. Large
vs. small tankers vs. pipelines, etc. are all trade-offs which
are heavily influenced by the economics of the system involved.
Simulation models are likely to yield a solution which will
determine the final answer.
Factory Location. Factory or warehouse location decisions, in
fact the structure of the distribution system, are a further class
that are likely to be determined by models. These decisions can
often be largely structured.
Unstructured Strategic Planning
Merger & Acquisitions. Decisions on expansions and purchases of
other corporations. The timing and price of an acquisition.
Capital placements and other fund-raising activities. These
and a host of similar problems of growth are unstructured.
New Product Planning. New product decisions, their pricing,
manufacturing methods, staffing and timing decisions are all
unstructured to some significant extent.
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Each of these examples is meant to be illustrative only. At any
organizational level the important decisions can be classified into these
six cells. The boundaries are admittedly fuzzy but at least for the
majority of decisions in each class there are quite different impli-
cations involved for each of the six cells. We explore these in the
material that follows.
Implications of the Framework
Planning
An immediate observation can be made in looking at this framework.
Almost all the so-called MIS activity has been directed at decisions
in the "structured" half of the matrix and within this in the "operational
control" cell.
As is obvious from this rough categorization, most of the inter-
esting areas that really concern managers, areas where decisions have
a significant effect on a company, are in the lower half of the diagram.
That is, managers of stature deal with unstructured decisions, if not
most of their working time certainly for most of their significant
decisions.
This implies of course that computers and related systems which
which have so far been largely applied to the structured area have not
yet had any real impact on management decision making - and that the
areas of high potential do not lie in bigger and better systems of the
kind most companies now have. Most of the opportunities for improving

21
the "effectiveness" as opposed to the "efficiency" of an operation
lie below the line separating structured from unstructured.
Therefore in planning the allocation of resources to the information
systems area, an organization should assess its activities in each of
these six areas. To have all the effort in only one of the cells
suggests at the ^^ery least a severe imbalance and that some consideration
be given to applications in the other areas.
A second point to be noted on the planning question is the
evolutionary nature of the line separating structured from unstructured
decisions. This line is moving down over time. As we improve our
understanding of a particular decision we can move it above the line
and allow the system to take care of it, freeing the manager for other
tasks more suited to his skills. For example in previous years the
inventory reordering decisions in most organizations were made by a
well-paid member of middle management. It was a decision that involved
a high degree of skill and its quality could make a big difference to
the profits of the organization. Today that same decision has moved
from the unstructured operational control area to the structured. We
have a set of decision rules (the EOQ formula) which on average do a
better job for the standard items than most human decision makers.
This movement of the line does not imply any replacement of managers
since we are dealing with an infinite set of problems. For every one
we solve there are ten to turn our attention to.
It is worth noting that the approach taken in building systems in

22.
the unstructured area hastens this movement of the Hne since U
focuses our analytical attention on decisions and decision rules.
This would lead us to expect a continuing flow of decisions across
the line, or at least into the "grey" semi -structured decision area
where either the intelligence, design or choice phases are unstruc-
tured. In other words through the development of a model of a given
problem solving process, we can establish the character of each of the
three phases. To the extent that any of these phases can be structured,
we can design direct systems support. For those aspects of the process
that are unstructured (given our current understanding of the situation),
we would call on the manager to provide the necessary analysis. Thus
a problem might be broken down into a set of related subproblems, some
of which are "solved" automatically by the system and the remainder
are dealt with by the user alone or with varying degrees of computational
and display support. Regardless o^ the resulting division of labor,
however, it is essential that a model of the decision process be con-
structed prior to the system design. It is only in this way that a
good perspective on the potential application of systems support can
be ascertained.
Structured/Unstructured
There is a series of implications that flow from the distinction
that has been drawn between structured and unstructured decisions.
A major focus of information systems ought to be on the important
decisions of the organization, many of which, as we argued above, are
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unstructured. The realization of this focus should be the development
of a model of the decision process that is involved. This model
development is fundamental, because it is a prerequisite for the
analysis of the value of information, and it is the key to the under-
standing of the portions of the decision process that can be supported
or automated. Both the successes and failures of the use of computers
in organizations to date can be understood largely in terms of the
difficulty of this model development.
Our discussion of SDS work showed that the vast majority of the
effort (and success) has been in the area of structured operational
control. The fact that this area is structured implies that there
exist definite, routine procedures for dealing with problems. Secondly,
in the operational control area, there is relatively little ambiguity
as to the goals sought. For example, the typical inventory control
problem can be precisely stated, and it is clear what the criterion is
by which solutions are to be judged. Hence we have a well understood
optimization problem. This type of problem lends itself to the
development of formal, "scientific" models, those typical of operations
research.
Another important characteristic of problems of this type is that
they are to a large extent "organization-independent." By this we
mean that the essential aspects of the problem tend to be the same in
many organizations, although details may differ. The generality of the
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has two important effects. First it encourages widespread interest and
effort in the development of solutions to the problem. Second, it makes
the adaption of general models to the situation in a particular organiza-
tional setting relatively easy.
The situation with regard to areas of management decision making
below the line is quite different. To the extent to which a given prob-
lem is semi-structured or unstructured, there is an absence of a routine
procedure for dealing with it. Also there is a tendency for there to be
some ambiguity in the problem definition. This is because of a lack of
formalization of any or all of the intelligence, design, or choice
phases of the decision making process. Confusion may exist as to the
appropriate criterion for evaluating solutions, or as to the means
for generating trial solutions to the problem. In many cases, this
uncertainty contributes to the perception of problems of this type as
being unique to a given organization.
In general, then, we can say that the information systems problem
in the structured operational control area is basically that of imple-
menting a given general model in a certain organizational context. On
the other hand, work in the unstructured areas is much more involved with
model development and formalization. Furthermore, the source of the
models in the former case is apt to be the operations research or
management science literature. In the latter case, however, the
relevant models are most often the as yet unverbalized models used by
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the managers of the organization. This suggests that the procedure for
tie development of systems, the types of systems, and the skills of the
analysts involved may be quite different in the two areas.
First consider the people involved in the systems development work.
The evolution of information systems activities in most organizations
has led to the accumulation of a variety of technical skills. In many
cases, the collective knowledge of computers and telecommunications is
impressive. In many of these same organizations, however, the impact
of computers on the way in which top managers make decisions has been
minimal. The reason for this is that the support of these decision
makers is not principally a technical problem. If it were, it would
have been solved. Certainly there are technical problems associated
with work in these problem areas, but the technology and the techno-
logical skills in most large organizations are more than sufficient.
This missing ingredient, apart from the basic awareness of the problem,
is the skill to elicit from management their view of their organization
and its environment and to formalize models of this view.
Unfortunately, success in operational control applications is no
guarantee of success in the unstructured problem areas. We have dis-
cussed the fundamental differences in the two types of problems in
order to underscore this point. In many cases, the view taken by
systems people experienced in the operational control areas is at best
inappropriate for MDS work.
Consider an extremely elementary view of a decision process. The
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picture 1s of a 'black box' with information as inputs and decisions as
outputs. The aim of a systems designer should be to improve the quality
of the decisions which are produced by the process. Basically this can
be done in two ways. Either the quality of the information inputs can
be improved (assuming that the actual decision process remains unchanged),
or the decision process can be altered (given the same information inputs)
Of course, there is always the possibility of changing both aspects at
the same time.
Because of the existence of a variety of optimization models for
operational control problems, there is a tendency for less emphasis to
be placed on the decision process in this area. In many cases, systems
designers know how to make optimal decisions (e.g., inventory control)
or at least very good decisions (e.g., production scheduling). The
emphasis in this area is on the improvement of the information inputs
to the decision model. Hence the importance of real time systems and
telecommunications and the like is great.
Although this emphasis on the quality of information inputs is
appropriate for structured operational control problems, it can retard
progress in developing support for unstructured problem solving. The
difficulty with this view 1s that it tends to attribute low quality in
management decision making to low quality information Inputs. Hence,
systems are designed to supply more current, more accurate, or more
detailed information. In the extreme, managers are inundated with such
information.
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While improving the quality of information available to managers
may improve the quality of thei ^ decisions, we do not believe that major
advances will be realized in this way. This is because we believe that
most managers do not have great informational needs, but rather they
have need for new methods to understand and process the information already
available to them. Generally speaking, the models that they employ in
dealing with this information are very primitive, and as a result, the
range of responses that they can generate is very limited. For example,
many managers employ simple historical models in their attempts to
2
anticipate the future. Further, these models are static in nature,
although the processes they purport to represent are highly dynamic.
In such a situation, there is much more to be gained by improving the
information processing ability of managers in order that they may
effectively deal with the information that they already have, than in
adding to the reams of data confronting them, or in improving the
3
qual ity of that data.
If this view is correct, it sugaests that the MDS area is important
and that systems to support decisions may best be built by people other
than those currently involved in the operational control systems area.
The requisite skills are those of model building based on close inter-
actions with management; structuring and formalizing the procedures
employed by managers; and segregating those aspects of the decision
process that can be automated. In addition, systems in this area must
R. Ackoff, "Management Misinformation Systems", Mgt. Sci ., vol. 14,
no. 4, Dec. 1967, pp. B147-156
2
W. F. Pounds, The Proce
Review , vol. 11, no. 1 (1969), ip. 1-20
^G. A. Gorry,
Review, (in press).
" ss of Problem Finding", Industrial Management
"The Development of Managerial Models", Sloan Management
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be able to assist the evolution of the manager's ability to deal with
the problems confronting him through increasing his understanding of
the environment. Hence, one important role of an MDS is educative.
Even in areas in which we cannot structure the decision process, we can
provide models of the environment from which the manager can develop
insights into the relationship of his decisions to the goals he wishes
to achieve.
In discussing models and their importance to systems in the MDS
area, we should place special emphasis on the role which the manager
assumes in the process of model building. To a large extent, he is the
source upon which the analyst draws. That is, although a repertoire of
"operations research" models may be \/ery valuable for the analyst, his
task is not to simply impose such a model on the situation. These
models may be the building blocks. The analyst and the manager in
concert develop the final structure. This implies that the analyst must
possess a certain empathy for the manager and vice versa . Whether the
current systems designers in a given organization possess this quality
is a question worthy of consideration by management.
Notice that this approach in no way precludes normative statements
about decision procedures. The emphasis on the development of descriptive
models of managerial problem solving is only to ensure that the existing
situation is well understood by both the analyst and the manager. Once
this understanding has been attained, various approaches to improving
the process can be explored. In fact, one of the chief benefits of the
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development of descriptive models of this type is that it exposes
management decision procedures so that they may be analyzed. Hope-
fully, this analysis will lead to improvements in these processes.
Decision Categories
The distinctions we have borrowed from Anthony have a set of
Implications distinct from those discussed in connection with the
structured and unstructured areas. The first of these has to do with
the systems design differences that follow from supporting decisions in
the three areas. In particular the "total systems" concept and the
popular "integrated data-base" notions can be seen to be badly mis-
leading if taken to their often advocated extremes. These points are
most easily made in relation to the information requirements. As was
seen earlier, the characteristics of the information differ sharply
among the three areas. There are few occasions in which it makes sense
to directly connect systems across these boundaries. Aggregating the
detailed accounting records to provide a base for a five-year sales
forecast is an expensive and unnecessary process. This is a poor
example perhaps but nevertheless we can often sample, estimate, or
otherwise obtain data for use in strategic planning without resorting
to the operational control data-base. This does not imply we should
never use such a data-base, but merely that it is unlikely to be the
best way of obtaining the information.
Similarly there are issues in the collection and maintenance of
data. Techniques appropriate for operational control data such as on-
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line data collection terminals are rarely justified for strategic
planning systems. Similarly, elaborate environmental sampling methods
may be critical for the success of a system to support strategic
decisions and unimportant for an operational control decision. In
looking at each of the information characteristics in Figure 1 it is
apparent that quite different data-bases and computer systems will be
required to support decisions in these three areas. Hence different
personnel skills, computer resources and software support will be
needed.
The systems distinctions made above are true for both structured
and unstructured decisions in each of the three areas.
A second distinction is the organizational structure and the
managerial and analyst skills that will be involved across these three
areas. The managerial talents available, the numbers and training of the
managers involved differ sharply between these categories. Strategic
decisions involve senior managers, and corporate staff in an informal,
highly iterative process with only a few people involved. The decision
process, the implementation process, and the level of analytical sophis-
tication of the managers (as opposed to the staff) all differ quite
markedly from their counterparts in operational control. The decision
makers in operational control have a more constrained problem. They
have often had several years in which to define the general nature of
the problem and possible solutions. In addition, to the extent these
managers have a technical background, they are more likely to be familiar
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with the analysis involved in looking both at structured and unstructured
problems. In any event, in the operational control area the training,
styles numbers and frequency of the decision all tend to produce design
and implementation problems of a different variety. The managers
involved are from the decision area in question, be it strategic plan-
ning, management control or operational control. As a result their
training, background and daily pattern of activity are different. This
means that the types of models to be used, the method of elucidation of
these from managers where appropriate and the skills of the analysts will
all differ across these three areas.
As the types of skills possessed by the managers differ so will the
kinds of systems analysts that can operate effectively. We have already
distinguished between analysts who can handle the structured versus
unstructured model building. There is a similar distinction to be made
between the kind of person who can work well with a small group of
senior managers (on both a structured or unstructured problem) and the
person who is able to communicate with, for example, the various
production personnel on an unstructured job-shop scheduling problem.
In addition the managerial and analyst issues raised above there is
the further difference in the way the information systems group is
organized. A group dealing only with operational control problems
would be structured differently and perhaps report to a different
organizational position than would a group that dealt with all three
areas. It is not our purpose here to go into detail on the organiza-
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tional issues but from the material above suggests that on strategic
problems a task force reporting to the user and virtually Independent
of the computer group may make sense. In management control a single
user although still dominant in his application, has problems of
interfacing with other users. An organizational design that encourages
cross functional (marketing, production, distribution, etc.) cooperation
is probably desirable. In operational control the organizational design
should include the user as a major influence but he will have to be
balanced with operational systems experts and the whole group can
quite possibly stay within functional boundaries. These examples are
merely illustrative of the kind of organizational differences that are
involved. Each company must examine its current status and needs and
make structural changes in light of these — hov/ever the different
decision areas do require different treatment.
The third distinction is between the types of models involved.
Again looking at Figure 1 and the information differences it is clear
that the models required to process this will be different. Tech-
niques such as technological forecasting, and " "' '
other models to deal with the future are much more prevalent in
strategic planning than they are in operational control. Another
example of model differences occurs due to the frequency of decisions
in each area and their relative magnitude. A strategic decision to
change the whole distribution system occurs rarely. It is significant
in cost, perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars and it therefore can
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support a complex model, but the model need not be efficient in any
sense, whereas an operational control decision may be made frequently,
perhaps daily. The impact of each decision is small but cumulatively
by the end of the year large sums of money are involved. Models for
the decision may have to be efficient in running time, have ready
access to current data and so forth.
Sunmary
The information systems field absorbs a significant percentage of
the resources of many organizations. Despite these expenditures there
is very little perspective on the field and the issues within it. As a
result there has been a tendency to make incremental improvements to
existing systems.
The framework we suggest for looking at decisions within an organ-
ization provides one perspective on the information systems issues. From
this perspective it becomes clear that our planning for information
systems has resulted in a heavy concentration in the operational control
area. In addition there are a series of implications for the organization
that flow from the distinction between the decision areas. Model
structure and the implementation process differ sharply between the
structured and unstructured areas. Systems personnel, organizational
structure and computer systems configurations all differ along the
Strategic Planning to Operational Control axis.
We are arguing, above all, that each organization should share some
coninon framework among its members if it is to make effective use of in-
formation systems. We suggest this framework is an appropriate place
to start.
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